Not so long ago, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) promoted a semi-official series of meetings (national, regional, and tri-continental), in preparation for its periodic international plenary conferences. UNCTAD was then the UN agency most seriously concerned with problems of third-world development as they related to international economic relations. The preparatory meetings had the double aim of engaging as many third-world officials, academics, and practitioners as possible in a serious dialogue on these problems, and mobilizing as much public opinion behind the proposed solutions as it could. The second aim was as important as the first, since those solutions, more often than not, ran up against fierce first-world opposition.
In early 1976, I attended one such tri-continental meeting in Sri Lanka. The participating continents were, of course, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In one of the plenary sessions, I proposed the adoption, by the third-world countries, of seven concise policy guidelines, which can be summarized as follows:1
- Trade between third-world countries should be direct. Imports from, as well as exports to, third-world countries, which pass through the intermediation of a third party, should be prohibited.
- A system of generalized preferences should be established between third-world countries. That system should cover transport and insurance as well.
- Payments from one third-world country to another should not pass through non-third-world intermediaries.
- Third-world producers’ associations which result in the rise of prices should compensate other third-world countries for additional payments involved.
- Technology devised in third-world countries should be made available freely, or at especially advantageous terms, to other third-world countries.
- Transnational third-world firms should have preferential treatment in third-world countries. No firm in which non-third-world capital participates can be considered a third-world transnational firm.
- Taxes should be imposed on all exports from third-world countries to non-third-world countries and on imports from non-third-world countries. The receipts of the taxes should be devoted to development purposes and operated by a special organization in which all developing countries are represented.
At present, when the third world is in retreat on all fronts, these guidelines may appear somewhat heroic. At the time they were proposed, they did not seem to be. In fact, they created quite a stir, both in the media and in academia. The reason should be ascribed more to the objective conditions then prevailing in the world at large than to the innate cogency of the guidelines.
In 1976, the third world was still living in the glow of the first important rise in oil prices, which took place in the wake of the 1973 Israeli-Arab war and the restrictions on production and exports used by Arab countries as a weapon in this war. Subsequent concerted, effective action, taken by the more important oil-producing countries (Arab and non-Arab), helped to maintain the level of prices reached at that time. On strict economic grounds, the rise was merely a readjustment of ridiculously low oil prices, which were maintained for decades by big oil companies, vehemently supported by their governments, which, together with banks and traders, reaped the main benefits. These adjustments were made and for quite some time maintained, notwithstanding the fulmination, threats and schemes the first world used to defeat what they considered to be an unforgivable affront to their supremacy—their ability to determine the size of world production, the location and prices of strategic commodities.
Like the oil-producing countries, other third-world producers of agricultural and mineral commodities (coffee, tea, cocoa, rubber, copper, tin, and so on) saw the real price of their exports steadily fall, over decades, especially as compared to the rising prices of their imports from the rich industrial countries. The result was a decrease in their foreign earnings, an increase in their foreign debt, and a continuous fall in their standard of living. Notwithstanding vehement opposition and much obstruction from the first world, the successful example of the oil-producing countries encouraged them to set up or attempt to set up commodity-producers’ boards, associations and consortia.
Third-world countries had many other grievances against first-world economic supremacy. Many other channels existed, through which surpluses flowed from the third-world countries to the first world. Most of the trade and financial transfers between third-world countries had to be intermediated by first-world countries. These countries naturally reaped for themselves the notorious surplus which intermediaries collected from both producers and consumers in every age and type of society. This was especially true if the intermediaries managed, as the first world generally did, to create for themselves various monopoly positions along the lines of intermediation.
The Hong Kong experience gives the measure of the enormity of this surplus. A little island with no natural resources or native industries to speak of, and a meager population of six and a half million, it managed, essentially through intermediation activities in trade and finance, to build an economy reaching US$700 billion (i.e., twenty-five percent of mainland China) and achieve a per capita GNP of US$21,650.
As used here and applied to North-South relations, the term “monopoly” has far wider connotations (closely connected to my own understanding of the theory of value and its determinants) than one usually meets in orthodox economic (read: Western) textbooks and their third-world imitations. It encompasses the exclusive historical sources of accumulation acquired by the West, the higher wages maintained there by trade union movements, acting in a democratic setting, and the power relations between North and South which forced on the latter a particular type of international division of labor, favoring the former and hampering the development of the latter. The other monopolies in the fields of technology, in advanced capital-goods sectors, in means of transport and communication, in banking, insurance, and maritime transport and, of course, in the fields of pure and applied science (R & D), are covered by the same concept of monopoly and were—and still are—as important a source for the transfer of resources from South to North as the ever-deteriorating terms of trade.
The successes of the first wave of the national liberation movements (1945-1978), their important social and economic content, the example of OPEC and other producers’ associations, and the flowering of various development theories in the third world (which freed many public opinion leaders, and far fewer academics, from the incapacitating hold of obscure ideological economic discourse masquerading as exact science), were all translated formally in the various UN declarations and resolutions which marked the seventies, and so much frightened the West. The Declaration and Action Program on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order [UN General Assembly Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of May 1, 1974]; the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX, December 12, 1976); and the resolution of the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Economic Cooperation in November 1975, are three of the more remarkable examples of a series of historical UN resolutions dealing with the world economy and seriously taking into account the interests of the third world.
The practical impact of those unprecedented charters and resolutions on the actual working of the World Capitalist System (WCS), hence on the disadvantaged position of the third world, was rather limited. They were carried from the heated atmosphere of the General Assembly’s hall to the register of accomplished legislation on the high waves of successive third-world military and political victories in the field. When these victories dried up and ceased to astound the world, the UN legislative provisions became what every law not suported by power is: dry ink on the pages of closed books.
A new World Economic Order (WEO) was indeed ushered in, in the wake of the second Gulf War of 1990-1991, but it was a very different order from the one aspired to and voted for by the peoples of the world in the UN assemblies. Indeed it was diametrically opposed to it, both in letter and spirit. I have no wish to determine here when the first great wave of third-world liberation subsided, for the decline of great historical movements is a protracted process which cannot be pinned to a definite date. Suffice it to say that the 1967 Arab defeat in the Israeli-Arab war and the subsequent generalized Arab decline on all fronts; the fratricidal (and suicidal) wars in Africa and elsewhere; the collapse of the Soviet Union, which whatever may have been its genetic or acquired weaknesses, has been in most crucial instances a staunch ally of national liberation movements; the ignominious Iraqi-Iranian War and the foolish Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; and the built-in weaknesses of the PLO, have all been landmarks along that road. No wonder the price of oil has now collapsed to an all-time low of eleven dollars, less in real terms than it was in 1971. Other raw materials, which are the mainstay of many poor countries’ foreign earnings, are experiencing similar decline. Foreign debts, especially when measured against foreign claims on their meager earnings, are becoming an intolerable burden and source of impoverishment.
The World Capitalist System as the Primary Unit of Analysis: An Analogy with the National Capitalist System
These developments should come as no surprise to anyone who takes the World Capitalist System (the WCS) as the primary unit of social analysis. For just as in a national capitalist system (NCS), relative or abolute impoverishment of the majority, unemployment or marginalization of many, and the spread of various manifestations of social disorder, are the natural results of the working of its laws, so do these phenomena manifest themselves in the WCS on a world scale as a result of the same laws, except, of course, that the mechanisms for surplus-flow from the base to the top may be somewhat different.
The achievements of first-world trade unionism (social democracy) in improving the conditions of labor in first-world countries may not be reproducible on a world scale; the dominant class in first-world capitalist countries can afford to make concessions to their working classes at the expense of third-world countries, to whom the burden of such concessions were shifted. No similar shift could operate in favor of the dominated and exploited countries within the WCS. The first-world countries cannot, as yet, compensate for concessions made to the third world by engineering a new flow of surpluses from the moon! The inevitable result is that, in a “fully achieved” WCS, impoverishment will hit the poor multitudes in its “base” countries heavier than it ever did in a national capitalist system; misery and alienation will hit them in more various and cruel ways, and despair may drive many into the blind alleys of regression. It should be clear, when making the analogy between the NCS and the WCS, that the totality of exploited and marginalized masses in third-world countries, and not just their working classes, form the base of the WCS. This means that any analogy between first-world trade unionism and its achievements in the developed NCS and the economic solidarity movement of third-world countries—which will be taken up at a later stage in this paper—should be taken for what it is: an (incomplete) analogy. It is an analogy between the labor-class solidarity within each developed NCS, taking the form of classical trade unionism, and the solidarity between the masses of the third-world countries, which obviously cannot take the “form” of classical trade unionism.2
The experience of some East and Southeast Asian countries may seem to contradict such dire predictions. There is no denying that in their various ways, they achieved remarkable successes in getting themselves out of the vicious circle of backwardness, in achieving unprecedented sustained rates of their GNP growth, their exports, the balance of payment surpluses, the application and adaptation of certain types of modern technology and, at least in some of them, in making concessions to some of their working people, which improved their standard of living.
I do not know, however, that these success stories invalidate the analogy I have drawn between the essentials of the NCS and the WCS. Contrary to many other social formations, and to certain dogmatic theorizations, the capitalist system, whether national or worldwide, usually allows a certain degree of mobility between the units which make up classes (individuals in the former and nations in the latter).
This mobility is, however, limited to a definite minority: a small percentage of the privileged few joining the ranks of the impoverished majority, and an equally small—even minute—percentage of the poor rising to the ranks of the various levels of the bourgeoisie; however, a wide residual base remains in its place in both cases. Britain may have sunk to join the “genteel” poor had it not been saved by the United States for various geostrategic, political, and cultural reasons. Japan, notwithstanding its various present difficulties, has definitely migrated to the rich zone of the World System.
The case of the Four East Asian Tigers is different, as indicated in an important study by three notable Egyptian economists.3 The geopolitical and historical context in which these experiences took place was exceptionally favorable to them. For a considerable period before the Second World War, Korea and Taiwan were colonized by Japan, which, for its own purposes and admittedly using very harsh practices, gave these two countries an adequate modern infrastructure, developed their mineral and agricultural resources, and established some heavy and capital-goods industries—practices which ran counter to the colonial traditions of the West in the rest of the colonial world. Following the Second World War, with victories of socialism in China and the Soviet Union challenging them, the United States and Britain were determined to make the four colonies (later the Four Tigers) a showcase on the eastern edge of Asia, capable of competing with their socialist adversaries for people’s minds. For that purpose, development funds flowed to them on an unprecedented scale, technology was obtained at low or no cost, markets were thrown wide open for their products in the metropolitan countries, and radical agrarian reforms were not merely tolerated but positively encouraged. Most remarkable of all, development and trade strategies and policies (including a certain level of national planning and the development of a public sector), which were vehemently opposed in other third-world countries, were not frowned upon. Evidently, these favorable conditions, and many others, are not reproducible elsewhere.
The Four Tigers had in common many unattractive aspects, which are usually glossed over by the promoters of their type of development. Notwithstanding the initial radical redistribution of wealth—especially of land—and some nationalization measures with which two of these began their trajectory, they all had to be subjected to extremely oppressive types of regimes, especially in regard to the working class. Wages had to be kept at a ridiculously low level in order to maintain their export advantage over more advanced, high-wage countries. Thus, they burdened the disadvantaged poor with the enormous weight of the high rates of investment, which was one of the main factors of their success.
Without denying them, however, I do not give much weight to the stories of corruption, nepotism, and cronyism, especially within the financial sector, which were later blamed for their recent difficulties, for these pertain to the stages of primitive and early capitalist accumulation everywhere. Even now, the pages of contemporary advanced capitalism are not as lily-white as textbooks lead us to believe: witness the stories of corruption and mismanagement which periodically fill the papers in the United States (the notorious Savings and Loan scandals), in the United Kingdom, in Italy and in Japan, especially in the same financial sectors which were blamed for the difficulties of the Asian Tigers and Cubs. We should also discount as a reason for the recent setbacks the often-blamed high percentage of borrowing of short-term foreign currency, much of which was used to finance real estate speculation, for in various periods these were also features of the U.S. economy (note what happened during the second term of the Reagan administration).
If these cannot be the main reasons for the setbacks which struck East Asian countries one after the other, then what were they? Those setbacks, you will remember, happened only after the collapse of the socialist system, hence the disappearance of the need to maintain the East Asian economies as showcases. With the disappearance of this political imperative, economic considerations came to the forefront. These were two: one of a profit-making nature, and the other strategic.
As a result of fierce popular political and economic struggle, wages began to rise considerably, especially in South Korea and Taiwan. It became much more profitable for foreign capital (including American and Japanese) to move many of its productive facilities to other East Asian countries, the so-called Asian Cubs, where wages and other amenities were kept at a much lower rate. This enabled foreign investors to sell their products in their own home and international markets at cheaper prices, and thus achieve much higher profits. This capital migration could not fail to have a deep destabilizing effect on the previously favored Tigers, corruption or no corruption.
The strategic consideration comes from the internal economic and political needs of the highly-developed countries themselves. Certain sectors of their economy—the so-called transnationals—may find it more profitable to move part or all of their activities to cheap-labor countries. Contrary to popular belief, however, these do not dominate the economic policies of these countries, except with regard to certain sectors where strategic raw materials (i.e., oil) are involved. Other home-based industries may have different and more weighty interests. Other countervailing factors, such as home-labor interests and greater political and public awareness of the catastrophic societal results of de-industrialization, may come into play. There are many indications that these factors are progressively playing a more important role in designing the strategy of first-world countries, i.e, the various discrete restrictions on free trade with low-wage countries, and the ominous policy restrictions affecting growth in the defaulting East Asian Tigers and Cubs, imposed by the World Bank and the IMF.
Japan managed to escape this fate because, for various historical reasons, it grew too big before it could be snared. Neither China nor India is likely to fall into this trap because, before opening up to the outside world, they made sure that, under some sort of auto-centered self-reliant development strategy, they built a broad and deep industrial base which could weather the onslaught of the turbulent storms of the WCS.
It is against this background that the series of summit meetings of the Group of Fifteen Third-World Countries must be viewed. The first of these meetings was held in Kuala Lumpur in 1990 and the eighth meeting is about to be held in Cairo. The movement is progressively broadening its aims from one summit to the next. It encourages deep reflection on the causes of the economic problems which plague third-world countries, and effective solutions to them. Most importantly, it strives to devise various businesslike organs and mechanisms whose task it is to insure that these solutions are implemented. I venture to think that, following the collapse of the first mighty Third-World Liberation Movement which began in 1945, the recent movement of the fifteen third-world countries may well be ushering in the beginning of a great second wave of third-world liberation. Given the deep, multifaceted crisis in which the first world seems to be engulfed, the world seems to be poised for such a rejuvenating movement.
In contrast to the first wave, it is essentially an economic solidarity movement, not a political one, though it is not oblivious to the wider political issues which can shape our world, such as the future of the non-aligned movement in the post-Cold War period, the necessity of restructuring the United Nations, especially the Security Council, and giving the poorer countries a more effective role in this body.
The greater emphasis on economic questions, especially those relating to South-South cooperation, may well reflect a laudable awareness that formal political freedom does not necessarily entail economic liberation. Building on the restricted political freedoms they had acquired, the best plan for achieving both sovereign political independence and genuine economic development is to concentrate on and focus their efforts toward economically meaningful goals.
The new movement definitely incorporates the great goals of the seventies, but adds to them more realism and practicality; periodicity of summit meetings is insisted upon. A permanent bureau for the movement was created. Projects like the study of ways and means for policy coordination and increasing South-South trade; the creation of a third-world database; and the criteria and measures of quality control and the mechanisms for strengthening the links between businessmen in third-world countries, have been assigned for research to certain countries. Institutional links between businessmen in both the public nd private sectors, such as fairs and facilities for making deals, are being created. This is a positive development. The temptation, however, to transform summit meetings essentially into fairs for showing off and making business deals must be resisted, for the new creation should be above all a think tank, a policy-maker and a decision-making body, and not just a marketplace dominated by businessmen.
It is heartening to read that a “moderate” head of state, in an informal press meeting, defined the Group as a “political economic group representing countries of the South and defending their interests and striving to organize South-South cooperation and inaugurating a serious and equal dialogue with the North.” He added in a recent public speech that, unless the international community enabled every country to introduce the economic transformation which takes into consideration its own conditions, the world transformation will rightfully lose its legitimacy and become furthest removed from globalism and universalism. It will become the monopoly of a definite group of peoples who reap the fruits of transformation, and lay down its rules, criteria, and dispositions. Another head of state, whose country was vandalized by irresponsible—or perhaps purposeful—financial speculation, announced that whereas the nineties were declared the decade of growth and sustained development in the North, for the South it is the lost development decade.
Most heartening of all is the fact that the Group of Fifteen does not set itself up as an exclusive club. It speaks in the name of the third world, looks after the interests of its poorer segments, and attempts to co-opt more countries to the Group.
Some countries of the South are still surprisingly absent, like South Africa. Less surprising, however, is the absence of the Four Asian Tigers. I certainly do not wish it upon them, but I think that future developments may convince them that their rightful place is with the rest of the third world.
The present article is being completed on the day when newspapers published the Declaration of the 8th Summit, so there is little time or space for analyzing its content. Certain remarks, however, strike me. The Declaration is less candid, less rigorous, in describing the present world economic situation, its roots, and the ways of reforming it, than even the statements made before and after it by some of the attending heads of state well-known for their “moderation” and caution. Perhaps that is the nature of conferences which tend to agree at the lowest common denominator, but it is a reminder of the famous Lebanese dictum “governments have their necessities but peoples have their needs.”
This dictum is not to be taken lightly. In our contemporary world, especially in the third world where some governments may be more eager to curry favor with the Great Powers than to mobilize and educate people about the tasks ahead, the fact is that unless third-world peoples move forcefully and lead their rulers into a struggle for the realization of their goals, those promising formal meetings, instead of being the harbingers of a mighty wave, will recede or break up on the shores of perilous little bargains, as the example of the Palestine National Liberation Movement shows.
The second thing to register here is that the last Summit Declaration was much more preoccupied with pressing issues, especially those relating to the East Asian monetary and financial crisis, than with the big strategic issues relating to the position of third-world countries within the World Economic System, and how that system could be reformed. Also, it was more concerned with the North-South dialogue than with the various types of South-South cooperation and the effective means of implementing them. This confirms what has been implied above: that unless the peoples of the third world, especially, in this case, its intellectuals and educated information media, strongly take possession of this great issue and make it their own, it will always remain fragile.
The third-world countries share the most essential causes of underdevelopment, many of its prominent features, and certainly the iron constraints which the first world forces upon them. They also vary enormously in per capita income, level of economic development, types of socio-economic formation, political institutions and culture, natural resources, geographical location, the nature and size of their imports, and in much else. These variations make for considerable divergence in their interests, and in their relationships with one another and the outside world.
The variations, however, should not be allowed to break up the unity of the third world. On the contrary, they can be transformed into grounds for solidarity and strength. This is neither impossible nor difficult. The living example is the states of the European Union, where many of the above differences exist (compare, for example, northern and western Europe with Greece and Portugal). They were able, nevertheless, through scientific thinking and practical constructive steps, to work toward the realization of their daring dreams and achieve unity. In contrast, Arab countries, where unifying factors are stronger, stagnated in their fragmented and conflictual condition, even moved backwards, because their ruling political elites, with their particular selfish interests, allowed what differentiates them to get the upper hand over what unifies them, and when pressed by their own peoples toward some form of unity or cooperation, failed to adopt a rational approach to this goal.
Going into these questions requires much more space than is available here. However, two major points can be stated briefly: On the economic side, the fifteen summit countries, and beyond them the third-world countries in general, should devise a reciprocal and balanced package deal in the fields of commerce and investment, of joint ventures, of the development and adaptation of technology, of policies affecting relations with one another and with the World Economic System, which insures that it will be accepted and implemented by the concerned parties. The guidelines outlined were designed to make possible such a package deal. I believe they can still serve this purpose, nothwithstanding the subsequent developments in the WCS, especially the creation of the World Trade Organization, and all of the agreements and decisions attached to it, which impose on third-world development permanent constraints not at all compensated for by the temporary concessions allowed. This is a specialized subject which should be dealt with by experts who are oriented toward the third world.
On the political side, each third-world state should completely refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other third-world countries, be they close or far, with full confidence that internal social forces will sooner or later affect internal conditions in various countries in ways which will draw them into the new ascending wave of national liberation.
A few important points remain, and can only briefly be referred to here:
- Third-world countries, forming an integral part of the WCS (the dependent part) cannot on their own, through South-South cooperation alone, hope to achieve results which exceed those attained by the trade union movements for the working classes in advanced countries. More likely, third-world achievements will be less because those countries will be moving inside the economic, social,and political structures of the advanced National Capitalist Systems to their own trade unions, notwithstanding the fact that the power of various organs of the WCS—states as well as international organizations like the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO—are less evident and transparent than the corresponding organs inside the states of the advanced NCSs.4
- The hoped-for second wave of third-world liberation cannot achieve all or part of its goals unless it is accompanied in a significant number of countries by major social, political, and economic transformations which lead to the adoption of what I call here, for the sake of brevity, the Auto-Centered Self-Reliant Strategy of Development.5
This strategy does not mean, as some writers pretend, attaining self-sufficiency or isolating themselves from the outside world or fighting against ongoing globalization (as distinguished from the powerful processes of westernization). It simply means: a) the adoption of policies which endow every important third-world country or group of countries with a wide, deep, integrated industrial-technological structure, which is indispensible for the achievement of sustained growth; b) a capacity for the acquisition, application, development, and adaptation of modern technology; c) facilities for mastering engineering design and construction, which form the backbone of any proper industrialization;6 d) complete mastery over their monetary and financial systems, enabling them to determine the sources, rates, and spheres of saving and investment; and e) control over external economic relations, allowing them to deal with the outside world in such a way as to enlist these relations in service of their own internal development, rather than allowing the external world, especially international institutions, to determine their development strategies in the interest of the dominant countries. In short, the adoption of a bundle of strategies expressed a long time ago, which form the historical foundation and the real content of what has been called (under the misguided influence of ideology or wishful thinking) the stage of transition to socialism (or of building it in the less-developed parts of the WCS, like Russia and China), and which was no more than the occasionally erroneous response to the challenge of varying degrees of backwardness and dependency.
This is as far as thought can reach concerning future development, if my hunch (it is no more than that) is correct that the WCS, both North and South, is about to enter into a protracted global crisis in certain parts of the world which has already begun in others, and that a positive response to that crisis can only take place if the advanced part is driven to take a rational and gradual approach to real socialism, while the South adopts, under whatever name, the strategy of Auto-Centered Self-Reliant Development.
It is difficult to determine what will take place when this happens, to determine whether these two different lines (which, in an increasingly independent global world, cannot be parallel) will meet in a cooperative way or in a contradictory, possibly antagonistic way, with all the dire results that the second outcome would entail. This is what will essentially determine the course of development in the twenty-first century.
The overall optimism which dominated socialist thought in the nineteenth century, and called on the workers of the world (actually meaning the West) to unite, is no longer sufficient. Historical experience over a whole century has shaken some of the assumptions and theoretical foundations on which that optimism was based, and brought to the foreground other elements which tended to be underestimated, like culture, nationhood, and the sheer atavistic racist and exclusivist sentiment. These factors, which should not in themselves lead to irresolvable antagonism (as the history of many past tolerant civilizations evidences), are being fanned into dangerous flames by narrow vested interests and primitive instincts. All that can be added now is the hope that the encounter between the trajectories of the first and third world will be cooperative rather than catastrophic.
- These guidelines were first published in “Cooperation of Third World Countries: Guidelines for a Charter,” Washington “International Development Review,” February 1976.
- This analogy, and the conclusions drawn from it, appeared in various works of mine, starting in 1976. Some of these works are referred to in the following footnotes.
- Ibrahim el-Essawy, director and editor; Ramzi Zaki; Hassan Al-Fakir; “The Experiences of Newly Industrialized Asian Countries,” (Cairo: The National Planning Institute, 1992).(In Arabic.)
- For the limitations of South Trade Unionism, see my article “Le nouveau syndicat du tiers mode,” Le Monde Diplomatique, June 1975.
- For a more detailed account of this subject, see my study “Third World Revolt and Auto-Centered and Self-Reliant Development,” IDEP Reproduction 406, 1976. An abridged version appeared in Toward a New Strategy of Development, A Rothko Chapel Colloquium (Pergamon Press, 1979).
- For the crucial importance of industrial design capability, see Ali Naguib, “An Essay on the Industrialization of Egypt,” (Cairo, 1985). (In Arabic.)