Lao Socialism with Buddhist Characteristics

The Religious and Historical Traditions of Laos

Since the establishment of the Lan Xang Kingdom in the fourteenth century, Theravāda Buddhism has been recognized as the state religion of Laos. By the mid-fifteenth century, signs of a Buddhist legitimization of the monarchy began to emerge. The traditional Lao polity based on the Muang (ເືມອງ) system viewed kingship as the cosmic center, with the king portrayed as both a “moral exemplar” and a “protector of the dharma” (the body of Buddhist teachings) as well as the supreme secular ruler.¹ Over time, Indian Buddhist philosophy merged with local Lao mythology, incorporating and legitimizing many traditions unique to Laos. The dharma was imbued with profound symbolic power, underscoring the central role of Theravāda Buddhism in Lao politics and culture. Buddhism provided strong justification for both royal authority and social stratification. It gradually became the “high religion” of Laos, with the ethnic Lao majority who practiced Buddhism being regarded as the “superior” ethnic group.

The spread of Buddhism in Laos not only deeply reshaped the worldview and beliefs of the people, but also left a lasting imprint on the social structures and political organization of the country. Buddhism introduced a new social hierarchy and created a distinct class of religious professionals, the Sangha. In this framework, the concepts of “karma” and “merit” became crucial determinants of social status, while royal authority emerged as the cornerstone of the political system.² The symbolic status of Theravāda Buddhism was continually reinforced, solidifying its role as a fundamental pillar of Lao culture. In this context, state legitimacy became increasingly dependent on the recognition and support of Buddhism.

The four Theravāda Buddhist countries in Southeast Asia—Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos—all pursued different paths toward modernization. In Thailand, democratic reforms significantly challenged the traditional social hierarchy and sakdina ideology (อุดมการณ์ศักดินา).³ However, the monarchy and Buddhism eventually regained legitimacy in new forms, further cementing the triad of monarchy, Theravāda Buddhism, and Thai identity.⁴ In Myanmar, although the monarchy was abolished under British colonial rule, public nostalgia for the dynasty interwoven with nationalism only grew stronger. Leaders such as U Nu and Ne Win often adopted a royal-like persona, seeking Buddhist approval in order to legitimize their roles as national leaders.⁵ In Cambodia, the monarchy was preserved, with the king representing a symbol of national identity, continuity, and ethnic unity. Under Norodom Sihanouk, Buddhism was employed as a tool to maintain the feudal hierarchy.⁶ In contrast, Laos, the only socialist state among the four, abolished its monarchy altogether, marking a decisive break with the traditional order. However, the long-established link between Buddhism and royal authority that had historically legitimized feudal autocracy remained a significant challenge. Dismantling this connection became a long-term, arduous task for the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP).⁷

Marxism and Buddhism during the Colonial and Civil War Periods

In 1893, Laos became a French colony. Faced with French colonial oppression, Lao socialists and Buddhists united to defend the independence of Lao Buddhism. They adopted socialist ideas in a nationalist manner, combining Theravāda Buddhism with Marxism. In their view, Buddhism could not only expel French culture and Christian influences from Laos, but also reshape traditional Lao culture. The synthesis of Marxism and Buddhism thus heralded the end of capitalist and imperialist rule.

During the Second World War, Japan occupied French Indochina, weakening France’s control over Laos. After Japan’s surrender, France reasserted its influence and once again made Laos a protectorate. In 1950, Laotian communists formed the Pathet Lao, launching guerrilla warfare against French colonial rule with the aim of regaining independence. Many monks joined the Pathet Lao movement, viewing it as a defender of traditional Lao culture against Western corruption.⁸ They saw Buddhism and Marxism as key ideological tools for transforming Laos from a colonized nation into a self-determined communist state and envisioned Maitreya Buddha as the spiritual leader of this new era.

Laos gained its independence in 1953 after years of struggle, but just as the nation was poised to begin its journey toward modernization, civil war erupted in 1959. The conflict saw the leftist Pathet Lao engaged in a fierce power struggle with the right-wing Royal Lao Government and centrist factions. During this time, the Pathet Lao developed a unique political ideology that blended socialist principles with Buddhist teachings. Prince Souphanouvong, a prominent leader in the Lao communist movement, used Buddhism to rally support for armed revolution, encouraging monks to disseminate communist ideas, particularly in rural areas, through propaganda efforts.

In 1961, Pathet Lao leaders, including Phoumi Vongvichit and prominent monks such as Voraphet and Thepbuali, founded the Lao Buddhist Fellowship Organization in liberated zones, integrating Buddhist doctrine with revolutionary ideals.⁹ Many well-educated monks and their followers aligned with the Pathet Lao or other pro-communist Buddhist organizations, balancing their religious duties with active participation in political struggle. These monks later became crucial to integrating Theravāda Buddhism with Marxism after the establishment of socialist governance.¹⁰

Lao Buddhism under the New Socialist Regime

In December 1975, Laos established the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), marking the beginning of its socialist regime. Amid postwar reconstruction, fostering national unity and strength became a pressing priority. With most of the population practicing Theravāda Buddhism, the religion played a pivotal role in shaping national consciousness, cultural identity, and cohesion. The LPRP adapted Buddhism to the political and economic goals of socialism, leveraging it to disseminate Marxist ideas, legitimize the new regime, and inspire collective efforts toward building a socialist society.

Theravāda Buddhism served as a practical framework for introducing Marxism in Laos. Its proponents drew parallels between the envisioned communist society, marked by material abundance and the holistic development of individuals, and the era of the Maitreya Buddha, thus making Marxist ideas more accessible.¹¹ This approach helped peasants and ethnic minorities, who often had limited education, accept these new concepts. Prince Souvanna Phouma observed that Lao people “became socialists through religion.”¹² By aligning Marxist principles with familiar Buddhist concepts, socialists and monks fostered the broad acceptance of socialist ideologies.

Traditional notions of merit are intentionally deemphasized in the Lao socialist state. In Theravāda Buddhist countries, wealth and poverty are often seen as the result of merit accumulated in past lives, a religious belief that significantly dampened the Lao people’s motivation to engage in the country’s economic development, particularly in the lowland rural areas. Farmers commonly spent the majority of their savings on religious ceremonies, with single events consuming three to four months of income.¹³ A large portion of village surpluses was also devoted to religious events and the construction of monuments.¹⁴ Although Theravāda Buddhism in Southeast Asia generally emphasizes religious individualism, performing acts of merit remains a crucial social activity in rural Laos. To address this, Phoumi emphasized the need for socialist countries to redirect resources away from religious ceremonies and break free from the influences of capitalism and feudalism. In the socialist state, Buddhist ceremonies were reframed to emphasize unity (ຄວາມສາມັກຄີ) rather than the accumulation of merit.¹⁵ Government interventions led to a significant reduction in rituals related to the agricultural cycle.¹⁶

Almsgiving, a core practice in Lao Buddhism, was seen by the LPRP as reinforcing feudal hierarchies, prompting the party to prohibit the public from giving food to monks. Beginning in 1976, the government launched “anti-parasite campaigns” to encourage monks to engage in productive work in exchange for food and to take on roles as teachers. This shift aimed to reduce monks’ focus on nonproductive activities such as meditation (kammatthana) and contemplation.¹⁷ The general public, however, was more resistant to these changes in religious practice.¹⁸ Many Lao farmers believed that the primary way to accumulate merit was by supporting the Sangha (such as through almsgiving) and adhering to Buddhist moral codes. As a result, they strongly resisted the government’s restrictions on merit-earning practices. In response to this opposition, the government gradually softened its stance, modifying regulations to permit limited offerings to monks in order to prevent waste.¹⁹ Over time and with continued government persuasion, the traditional notion of accumulating merit and gaining social prestige through almsgiving was downplayed.

For much of Laos’s history, the Sangha was the only vertically organized institution reaching down to the village level and was deeply embedded in rural society.²⁰ Monks served as a bridge between the party and the people, working closely with LPRP propaganda cadres and actively promoting theoretical education across the country. Many monks, particularly those involved in communist movements in Laos and Indochina, were highly receptive to the party’s reframing of Buddhist teachings and willingly took on the responsibility of spreading Marxist ideas. Monks held significant social prestige in rural Laos and their support for government policies was crucial in post-independence literacy campaigns. Their influence helped Marxist principles gain wider acceptance among peasants and ethnic groups in the mountainous regions. During this period, temples also functioned as cooperatives, playing an important role in advancing the party’s goals in rural communities.

Buddhist Influences on Laos’s Economic Development

Rooted in the Theravāda Buddhist philosophy of the “Middle Way” and the concept of moderation, Laos’s traditional economic outlook emphasizes frugality, rejects greed, and prioritizes community solidarity and mutual assistance. These principles have profoundly influenced the government’s economic policymaking, fostering a preference for stability and gradual reform. At the 1998 conference on “Building Political Grassroots and Rural Development,” Party Chairman Khamtay Siphandone highlighted that “socialism is a long-term goal, achievable only through a lengthy transitional process.”²¹ The introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1986 reflected this cautious approach to reform. A key aspect of the NEM was its support for agriculture and small-scale economic activities. This policy encouraged farmers to pursue self-sufficiency and independent operations within rural communities, aligning closely with the Buddhist ideals of “minimal desires and contentment.” To facilitate these goals, the government reduced controls on the prices of agricultural products, eased restrictions on small enterprises, and prioritized the protection of smallholder economies and community-based initiatives. Today, agriculture continues to play a vital role in the Lao economy, employing approximately 61 percent of the workforce, with two-thirds of the population residing in rural areas.²²

Tourism has emerged as an important financial pillar supporting Laos’s socialist development. The sector has generated substantial employment opportunities and significantly improved local economies. In 2019, Laos hosted 4.8 million international visitors, a 14.4 percent increase from the previous year, garnering over $900 million in annual tourism revenue. The tourism industry accounts for 13 percent of Laos’s GDP and employs 13 percent of the workforce.²³ Among the country’s 2,237 tourist sites, 575 are cultural and 331 are historical.²⁴ The Lao government places great importance on preserving and promoting Buddhist culture, using Buddhist festivals like Songkran to showcase national traditions. Buddhist temples and cultural heritage sites in destinations such as Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champasak have become major attractions for international visitors.

The Important Role of Monastic Education in Laos’s National Education System

In Laos, the training of socialist builders and successors is considered the core mission of education, and Theravāda Buddhism plays a very important role in the educational system. Monasteries have long functioned as both centers of religious practice and hubs for education and cultural preservation. During the French colonial period, secular schools were established in urban areas to train civil servants while monastic schools remained indispensable in rural and remote regions. These schools undertook a dual mission: teaching traditional religious studies alongside fundamental skills in literacy and arithmetic. By 1935, Laos had 387 monastic schools nationwide educating over 7,500 students—a number that exceeded the 6,500 enrolled in secular primary schools at the time.²⁵

After independence, Laos experienced a significant expansion of its education system, especially in secular primary education. By the time the Lao PDR was established in 1975, the number of primary schools had risen dramatically, from 679 in 1954 to 4,444.²⁶ These schools placed a strong emphasis on character development through Buddhist ethics and moral education. Concepts such as “right mindfulness” and “right conduct” were integrated into curricula, instilling qualities like integrity, self-discipline, and humility. In 1990, Laos signed the World Declaration on Education for All, promoting initiatives to universalize primary education. A related decree issued in 1996 further strengthened these objectives.²⁷ By 2020, the net enrollment rate for 5-year-olds had reached 82.7 percent, while the net enrollment rate for primary education generally climbed to 99 percent. Additionally, the gross enrollment rates for lower and upper secondary education rose to 83.3 percent and 54.8 percent respectively, signaling great progress in educational access.²⁸

The importance of strengthening monastic education has long been acknowledged. In 1991, the LPRP emphasized the need to enhance the quality of religious teaching within the monastic system. This commitment was reaffirmed in 2017 with the enactment of the Monk’s Education Decree, which officially incorporated monastic education as an integral part of the national education system.²⁹ The government actively supports monastic education by promoting core Buddhist values and fostering partnerships between schools and monasteries. Monks also play an active role in community outreach, sharing teachings on compassion and justice, and schools regularly incorporate Buddhist ethics courses and community service programs in order to cultivate students’ sense of social responsibility. This educational model has significantly contributed to personal growth and the promotion of social harmony.

Alignment of Government Eco-Policies with Buddhist Principles

Theravāda Buddhism emphasizes patience, moderation, and compassion, advocating for harmony between humans and nature. Through the doctrine of karma, it encourages a prudent approach to natural resource use and discourages greed and overexploitation. This ecological ethic has shaped Lao environmental policies and practices, fostering the integration of “green growth” principles into national development strategies.

In 2018, the Lao government introduced the “National Green Growth Strategy of the Lao PDR till 2030,” embedding green growth into national development plans and sectoral policies. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism promoted “green, socially, and environmentally friendly tourism” while the Ministry of Public Works and Transport partnered with the foreign firm Eptisa Servicio de Ingeniería SL to design and pilot sustainable transportation initiatives in four districts of Vientiane: Chanthabuly, Sikhottabong, Sisattanak, and Saysettha.³⁰ At the same time, Laos has advanced eco-agriculture, clean energy, and green building initiatives, aligning economic growth with ecological protection and embedding green development principles into its socialist framework.

Also since 2018, the government has implemented a policy to consolidate small villages into larger sustainable communities, transforming them into “livable, charming, green towns” in rural areas. To support this, microloan funds and other rural financing mechanisms were introduced, fostering the production of traditional goods such as cotton textiles, silk fabrics, and bamboo crafts, thus stimulating rural economic development.³¹ Forest conservation also remains a key component of Laos’s green socialism. By 2019, the country’s forest coverage rate had increased to 62 percent, with a government plan to raise the proportion of forested land to 70 percent by 2025.³²

Buddhist culture offers unique religious and cultural support for Laos’s green development. Temples play a central role in promoting environmental awareness, hosting eco-campaigns during Buddhist festivals to enhance public ecological consciousness. Furthermore, Laos has adopted a community-driven ecological management model that underscores the importance of grassroots involvement in environmental conservation. This approach not only aligns with the collective values of socialism, but also mitigates environmental challenges associated with centralized development. Its impact is especially pronounced in rural areas where Buddhist traditions remain deeply entrenched.

The Buddhist Foundations of Laos’s Diplomatic Philosophy

Theravāda Buddhism emphasizes peace, harmony, nonviolence, and “non-contentiousness,” advocating for respect and tolerance. These ideals have profoundly shaped Laos’s foreign policy. In managing relations with neighboring countries such as China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar, Laos has adopted a balanced diplomatic approach by maintaining peaceful neutrality and avoiding conflict or confrontation, thus reducing the risk of becoming entangled in great power rivalries.

The Buddhist values of compassion and mutual assistance have also encouraged Laos to foster economic cooperation. On December 3, 2021, the China-Laos Railway commenced operations, spanning 1,035 kilometers and connecting Vientiane to Kunming, China. By November 18, 2024, the Lao section of the railway had transported 7.2 million passengers and over 10.5 million tons of crossborder cargo, injecting vital energy into Laos’s economy and regional development.³³ Along this railway, Laos plans to establish several “Smart Cities”—urban centers that will employ high tech solutions for planning and provision of city services—by 2025, including Luang Namtha, Oudomxay, Luang Prabang, and Vientiane Province.³⁴

Crossborder exchanges between Lao and Thai monks, along with religious tourism, are flourishing. Thailand’s Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University provides annual scholarships to Lao monks for advanced studies in Thailand. In addition, the two nations jointly host large events during Buddhist festivals, such as Thailand’s Makha Bucha Day and Laos’s That Luang Festival. These activities have attracted a large number of tourists and promoted economic cooperation while enhancing civil exchanges between the two countries.

In partnering with Vietnam to develop economic corridors, Laos embraces the principles of mutual benefit and shared prosperity, reflecting Buddhist ideals of “selfless giving” and reciprocity. Since joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Laos has accelerated its economic integration, particularly through initiatives such as the Greater Mekong Subregion program. This partnership has significantly enhanced infrastructure connectivity, crossborder trade, and investment opportunities. Laos also plays an active role in managing the Mekong River basin’s water resources, working collaboratively with neighboring countries to ensure sustainable development and equitable utilization of the river. Through its growing hydropower sector, Laos has advanced regional energy integration, exporting electricity to countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. During its Eighth Five-Year Plan, Laos exported nearly 130 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, generating $7.2 billion in revenue—a 164 percent increase from the previous five-year period.³⁵ These efforts reflect Laos’s commitment to ecological and community awareness while making substantial contributions to the sustainable development of the regional environment.

Theoretical Conflicts and Practical Dilemmas

Much of the philosophical terminology in the Lao language is derived from Buddhism, having roots in Sanskrit and Pali. Consequently, Lao socialists frequently use Buddhist terms and teachings to explain Marxism, attempting to find common ground between the two ideologies through the lens of Buddhist tradition. For many in rural Laos, socialist ideas were made more accessible by blending them with traditional customs and religious practices. Among the intellectual elite, socialist concepts were rationalized through modern interpretations of Buddhist teachings. This allowed Marxist ideas, unfamiliar to many, to be understood and accepted when contextualized within Buddhism.

However, Laos faced a significant theoretical challenge in constructing a socialist society with Theravāda Buddhist characteristics: reconciling Buddhism’s idealistic focus on the “otherworldly” with Marxism’s materialist foundations. The LPRP responded by reinterpreting Theravāda Buddhist teachings, aligning them more closely with what they viewed as the Buddha’s original intent. They worked to curb superstitions, regulate religious rituals, and utilize the Sangha as a vehicle for promoting Marxism. At the same time, monks were given socialist education and gradually encouraged to address real-world issues, actively participating in economic development and social production. These efforts significantly facilitated the spread of socialist ideas across Laos and played an essential role in strengthening national cohesion, raising public awareness of democracy, and exploring paths for equitable social development. Through this process, Laos gradually distanced itself from the Vietnamese model, instead charting a distinctly Laotian path toward socialism, grounded in the values and principles of Theravāda Buddhism.

Marxism at its core takes a staunchly atheistic stance. For Karl Marx, religion was “the opium of the people,” a tool that provides an illusory satisfaction of unmet material needs by offering fantasies of an afterlife. Religion, in his view, constructs an “inverted world-consciousness,” presenting itself as an absolute truth beyond the real world.³⁶ In doing so, it inverts the relationship between the material world and the afterlife. Marxism asserted that religion alienates human subjectivity, reducing people to passive objects while elevating gods—humanity’s own creations—to positions of real authority. As such, religion, according to Marxism, acts as an alienating force that is fundamentally incompatible with its materialist worldview, making it theoretically challenging for Laos to fully integrate Theravāda Buddhism with Marxism.

Adding to these difficulties are problems deeply rooted in Buddhist traditions, such as the cult of kingship, patronage relationships, and ethnic estrangement. These factors present unique challenges to Laos’s socialist development and complicate efforts to achieve an inclusive and cohesive society.

Economically, Laos relies heavily on capital-intensive industries such as mining and hydropower—a model fraught with vulnerabilities. To attract foreign investment, the government has implemented extensive tax exemptions, leading to insufficient tax revenues. Meanwhile, infrastructure projects, particularly in the realm of hydropower, increasingly depend on external debt. This reliance coupled with fluctuating mineral prices, electricity tariffs, and weather conditions makes the development model highly fragile. Despite some structural shifts, such as a decline in agriculture’s contribution to GDP (from 17 percent in 2016 to 15 percent in 2020) and an increase in industry’s share (from 29 percent to 32 percent), the pace of transformation remains slow.³⁷

The Cult of Kingship

Throughout Lao history, the monarchy has held a central role in the nation’s political structure. In Theravāda Buddhism, the king was regarded as the embodiment of accumulated merit, with his virtuous character serving as the foundation of his legitimate rule. With the rise of the feudal system, the king became not only the guardian of the state, but also the protector of Buddhism and a practitioner of the dharma. For much of Laos’s past, the king, the state, and the dharma were perceived as inseparable, with loyalty to the monarch equated with loyalty to the state and reverence for Buddhism.

The separation of Buddhism from the monarchy was a central strategy in dismantling royal worship in Laos. In 1975, the People’s Congress of Laos declared the abolition of the monarchy, compelling King Sisavang Vatthana to abdicate and thus bringing an official end to the Laotian monarchy, which had endured for over six hundred years. While this was intended to represent a complete break from traditional power structures, the impact was somewhat softened by the appointment of Prince Souphanouvong as the first President of the Lao PDR (1975–1991) and the first President of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly of Laos (1975–1989).

The Lao people’s worldview has long been influenced by the close ties between kingship and Buddhism, in which secular power structures often mirrored religious beliefs. Before the socialist system was implemented, many believed that “heaven” itself was hierarchical. After the revolution, the monarchy was abolished, aristocratic families were dissolved, and many Buddhist rituals reinforcing the monarchy were discontinued. For a time, people began to believe that the idea of “heaven” implied the achievement of equality. However, as former royal family members gradually returned to positions of power, the elite class retained its privileges. This, coupled with a widening wealth gap, led some to question whether true equality had been achieved after all.

In the twenty-first century, the influence of Dhammic socialism promoted by Thailand’s Buddhist reformers has further reinforced the reverence for kingship among certain Lao monks and followers. Although these reformist monks embrace socialist ideals, they also promote a version of Buddhist socialism under monarchical dictatorship led by a ruler who embodies the “Ten Royal Virtues” (dasarajadhamma) and practices “righteous authoritarian rule” in accordance with the dharma.³⁸ While these reformers aim to find a middle ground between traditional monarchy and modern democracy that could gain broad social acceptance, their efforts are hindered by the continued framework of kingship. As Marx pointed out, “As the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord, so has Clerical Socialism with Feudal Socialism.”³⁹ The religious identity of Buddhist monks makes it difficult for them to fully detach from the cult of kingship. To this day, Laos faces significant challenges in completely eliminating the mindset of royal worship.

The Patron-Client Relationship

Laos, with its weak industrial base, has left the majority of its farmers untouched by the proletarianization process, allowing conservatism and a culture of obedience to endure. The patron-client system (ລະບົບການອຸປະຖໍາ) continues to exert a strong influence, even in modern times. This system, deeply embedded in Laos’s hierarchical social structure, creates an informal power network based on protection and dependency with reciprocity and rewards at its core. Patrons—such as nobles, wealthy individuals, and political leaders—gain merit through “good deeds” (including almsgiving and donations) and by providing protection, resources, and opportunities, while clients (those under protection) repay them with political support, loyalty, and obedience.⁴⁰

Despite the Lao government’s efforts to dismantle old feudal relationships and traditional power structures and to build an equal socialist society based on Marxist-Leninist principles, deeply entrenched patron-client relationships have significantly hindered socialist reforms and slowed the country’s modernization process.

Although the socialist system formally eliminated the influence of the feudal monarchy, certain forms of power centralization and nepotism persist. Some senior leaders continue to maintain personal power through old patronage networks, creating a new system of exchange of interests between local and central authorities. Rural and local officials use these informal networks to access state resources, prioritizing distribution to loyal supporters. This dynamic allows local officials to retain significant independence in managing local affairs, thereby weakening the central government’s ability to exercise effective oversight and enforce policies at the grassroots level. In the early years of socialist construction, the Lao government promoted collective agricultural policies aiming to increase productivity through land collectivization. However, the patron-client system allowed some rural elites to exploit the process for personal gain, undermining the concrete outcomes of collective farming and reducing collective farms, in some instances, to mere formalities.

The patron-client relationship continues to perpetuate power structures and dependency systems from Laos’s feudal era, giving the country’s bureaucratic system an informal and personalized character. Power distribution often depends more on personal connections than on public institutions, resulting in a political environment where personal loyalty outweighs formal rules and collectivist principles. This undermines efficient governance and hampers efforts to build a state based on the rule of law and collective interests. Rooted in socioeconomic inequality and hierarchical structures, the patron-client system has long intensified problems such as unequal resource distribution, the abuse of power, and political corruption, further deepening social divisions. Theravāda Buddhism, especially in rural and religiously conservative regions, reinforces this hierarchical framework through its social norms and ideals. This alignment between traditional structures and religious values presents significant challenges to Laos’s socialist development. Consequently, the socialist state has been compelled to make compromises and concessions to the entrenched traditional social structures. These adjustments have in turn limited progress toward a more equitable and modern society.

Ethnic Estrangement

After the establishment of the Lao PDR, the LPRP provided ethnic minorities with equal opportunities for political participation alongside the lowland Lao groups. It recruited minorities into the army and granted them regional autonomy, allowing them to use their native languages in education and administration. These policies opened unprecedented opportunities for social mobility and political advancement for minority groups.⁴¹

After the decline of socialism in the 1990s, Theravāda Buddhism became increasingly intertwined with nationalism, blurring the lines between Buddhist and Lao identity. The government promoted Buddhism as a symbol of national unity while “foreign” religions such as Christianity were denounced as divisive forces. This narrative of Buddhist nationalism often equated being a Buddhist with being a “true Lao,” and other religious beliefs, particularly Christianity, were seen as potentially subversive.⁴² Christian adherents, such as some Hmong and Tai groups, were considered carriers of foreign culture and faced political and social marginalization. In addition, ethnic minorities continue to be economically disadvantaged. The mountainous and rural regions where many of these groups reside suffer from underdeveloped infrastructure and lagging economic growth, leaving them far behind the predominantly ethnically Lao areas in terms of access to resources and development opportunities. While these regions are often resource-rich, the interests and needs of their inhabitants are frequently overlooked in matters of resource extraction and land use. With the resurgence of Buddhist nationalism, the Lao socialist project now faces a dual challenge: addressing long-standing ethnic issues while contending with the pressures of modernization and globalization.

Conclusion

The Lao PDR is one of the five nations in the world led by a Marxist political party. Despite coming to power relatively late, the LPRP has developed innovative approaches to shaping a socialist model appropriate to Laos’s unique national context. As a Theravāda Buddhist country, the introduction of Marxism inevitably clashed with Laos’s conservative feudal culture and deeply entrenched religious traditions, resulting in a unique historical developmental trajectory. Over time, Marxism and Theravāda Buddhism in this context have undergone a prolonged process of mutual adaptation and integration. By acknowledging the traditional role of Buddhism in society, the LPRP has managed to avoid sharp religious-political conflicts, maintain social stability, extend grassroots influence, and garner public support for the nation’s development path. This synthesis has profoundly influenced Laos’s economy, education, environmental protection policies, and international relations, forging a distinctive socialist development path. However, significant contradictions and challenges remain. The core spiritual teachings of Theravāda Buddhism differ fundamentally from the atheistic and materialist foundations of Marxism, making it difficult to reconcile these theoretical differences. Consequently, the socialist transformation of Theravāda Buddhism has often been accompanied by ideological ambiguity and confusion. On the practical level, this integration has provided Laos with a unique framework for social development, but has also exposed deep-rooted challenges. Addressing persistent issues such as royal worship, patron-client relationships, and ethnic estrangement—all closely linked to Buddhist traditions—remains a central challenge to the country’s socialist project today.

Notes

1. ↩ “Dharma” in Buddhism refers to the teachings of the Buddha, the universal truth, and the path of practice that leads to enlightenment. It encompasses the principles of moral conduct, wisdom, and mental discipline, guiding individuals to live in harmony with the cosmic law and to attain spiritual liberation.
2. ↩ In Buddhism, “merit” (puñña) refers to the positive spiritual energy or virtue accumulated through good deeds, moral behavior, generosity, and acts of kindness. It is believed to improve one’s karma and lead to better rebirths or advancement on the path to enlightenment.
3. ↩ The sakdina system is a feudal structure in ancient Thailand. Thai feudal society is also known as สังคมศักด‘น“ (sakdina society). For a detailed analysis of Thailand’s feudal society and its historical context, see Yumeng Liu, A Study on the Thammasat University Translation of the Thai Version of the Communist Manifesto (Liaoning: Liaoning People’s Publishing House, 2023), 50–54.
4. ↩ For more discussions on this topic, see Yumeng Liu, “Marxism’s Voyage Across Thailand: An Unfolding Odyssey,” Socialism and Democracy 37, no. 3 (2023): 81–98.
5. ↩ Roger Kershaw, Monarchy in South-East Asia: The Faces of Tradition in Transition (London: Routledge, 2001), 57.
6. ↩ For Sihanouk’s elaboration of his Buddhist socialist ideas, see Norodom Sihanouk, “Our Buddhist Socialism,” Kambuja Review, no. 8 (1965): 1–38.`
7. ↩ The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), originally established as the Lao People’s Party in 1955, was renamed during its Second National Congress in 1972.
8. ↩ Patrice Ladwig, “Millennialism, Charisma and Utopia: Revolutionary Potentialities in Pre-modern Lao and Thai Theravāda Buddhism,” Politics, Religion and Ideology 15, no. 2 (2014): 308–29.
9. ↩ Boun Rasdavong, “A History of Lao Buddhism,” Master’s thesis, Maha Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 2005, 42–46.
10. ↩ Martin Stuart-Fox, Buddhist Kingdom, Marxist State: The Making of Modern Laos (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1996), 92–93.
11. ↩ Khamthan Thepbuali, ພຣະສົງລາວ ແລະ ການປະຕິວັດ [The Lao Monks and the Revolution] (Vientiane: Neo Lao Haksat, 1975), 44–47.
12. ↩ Francois Houtart, “Buddhism and Politics in South-East Asia: Part Two,” Social Scientist 5, no. 4 (1976): 42.
13. ↩ Grant Evans, “Buddhism and Economic Action in Socialist Laos,” in Socialism in Anthropological Theory and Local Practice, ed. C. Han (London: Routledge, 1993), 130–32.
14. ↩ Joel Halpern, “Capital, Savings and Credit among Lao Peasants,” Proceedings of the Werner Grenn Symposium on Economy and Anthropology, Chicago, 1961, 3–4.
15. ↩ Phoumi Vongvichit, ໄດຣີລະບຶກຂອງຊີວິດ [Memoirs of My Life] (Vientiane: Lao State Printing, 1987), 171.
16. ↩ Some scholars have criticized the Lao government’s policies, suggesting that they reflect a socialist and atheist agenda that imposes restrictions on religious freedom; see Evans, “Buddhism and Economic Action in Socialist Laos,” 123–40; Patrice Ladwig, “Contemporary Lao Buddhism: Raptured histories,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Buddhism, ed. Michael Jerryson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 275–96. However, I contend that the economic underdevelopment of Laos and the widespread poverty among its farmers were also significant factors contributing to the limitations on Buddhist offerings. When evaluating these government measures, it is essential to consider the context of Laos’s economic backwardness during that time.
17. ↩ This has led to the gradual disappearance of the forest monastic tradition (arannavasi) in Theravāda Buddhism in Laos.
18. ↩ Pierre-Bernard Lafont, “Buddhism in Contemporary Laos,” in Contemporary Laos, ed. Martin Stuart-Fox (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 156–58.
19. ↩ Lafont, “Buddhism in Contemporary Laos,” 157.
20. ↩ Vonsavanh Boutsavath and Georges Chapelier, “Lao Popular Buddhism and Community Development,” Journal of the Siam Society 61, no. 2 (July 1973): 15.
21. ↩ Khamtay Siphandone, “ເນື້ອໃນສຳຄັນຂອງບົດອຸທົມຂອງທ່ານ ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນໂດນ, ປະທານຄະນະບໍລິຫານສູນກາງພັກປະຊາຊົນປະຕິວັດລາວ, ປະທານປະເທດ ສປປ ລາວ, ໃນທີ່ປະຊຸມວຽກງານກໍ່ສ້າງຂະຫນານການເມືອງ ແລະພັດທະນາຊົນນະບົດ (ວັນທີ 21/12/1998) [Speech of the Chairman of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, President of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Comrade Khamtay Siphandone, at the conference on Building Political Grassroots and Rural Development on December 21, 1998],” ອນໄມ້ (November–December, 1998): 9.
22. ↩ United Nations Development Programme, National Human Development Report, Lao PDR 2022: Youth As Drivers for Sustainable Development (Vientiane: UNDP, 2022), 21, 14.
23. ↩ In 2020, due to the impact of COVID-19, the number of international tourists dropped to 880,000, representing a decrease of 81.49 percent compared to 2019. See: Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR), “9th Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2021–2025),” March 2021, 43.
24. ↩ Secretariat for Formulation of National Green Growth Strategy of the Lao PDR, “National Green Growth Strategy of the Lao PDR till 2030,” December 2018, 51.
25. ↩ Geoffrey C. Gunn, Rebellion in Laos: Peasant and Politics in a Colonial Backwater (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2003), 54.
26. ↩ Richard Noonan, “Education in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic: Confluence of History and Vision,” in C. Brock and L. P. Symaco, eds., Education in Southeast Asia (Oxford: Symposium Books, 2011), 69–94.
27. ↩ Prime Minister’s Office, “Decree on Compulsory Education” (No. 138/PMO/96), August 15, 1996.
28. ↩ LPDR, “9th Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2021–2025),” 21.
29. ↩ Government of Lao PDR, “Decree on Monk’s Education” (No. 24/GOV), January 16, 2017.
30. ↩ Secretariat for Formulation of National Green Growth Strategy of the Lao PDR, “National Green Growth Strategy of the Lao PDR till 2030,” 14.
31. ↩ Secretariat for Formulation of National Green Growth Strategy of the Lao PDR, “National Green Growth Strategy of the Lao PDR till 2030,” 26–28.
32. ↩ LPDR, “9th Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2021–2025),” 25, 80.
33. ↩ Sun Guangyong, “中老铁路老挝段单日旅客发送量创新高 [Laos Section of the China-Laos Railway Sets New Record for Daily Passenger Volume],” People’s Daily, November 19, 2024.
34. ↩ LPDR, “9th Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2021–2025),” 91.
35. ↩ LPDR, “9th Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2021–2025),” 91, 19.
36. ↩ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975), vol. 3, 175.
37. ↩ UNDP, National Human Development Report, Lao PDR 2022, 20–21.
38. ↩ Bhikkhu Buddhadasa, Dhammic Socialism (Bangkok: Sahamitr Printing, 1986), 109–13.
39. ↩ Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 6, 508.
40. ↩ James C. Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science Review 66, no. 1 (March 1972): 91–113.
41. ↩ Gary D. Wekkin, “The Rewards of Revolution: Pathet Lao Policy towards the Hill Tribes since 1975,” in Contemporary Laos, ed. Stuart-Fox, 188–89.
42. ↩ Phra Santisouk, “ຄໍາສອນຂອງພຸດທະສາດສະຫນາແລະຊີວິດ [Buddhist Teachings and Life],” Pasaxon, January 26, 2004.